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We studythe close connections between game the-
ory, on-line prediction and boosting. After a brief
review of game theory, we describe an algorithm
for learning to play repeated games based on the
on-linepredictionmethods of Littlestoneand War-
muth. The analysis of this algorithmyields a sim-
ple proofof von Neumann’s famous minmax theo-
rem, aswellasaprovablemethodofapproximately
solvinga game. We thenshowthattheon-linepre-
diction model is obtained by applying this game-
playingalgorithmtoanappropriatechoiceofgame
and that boostingis obtainedby applyingthe same
algorithm to the “dual” of this game.
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to bring out the close connec-
tions between game theory, on-line prediction and boosting.
Brieﬂy, game theory is the study of games and other interac-
tions of various sorts. On-line predictionis a learning model
in which an agent predicts theclassiﬁcation of a sequence of
itemsandattemptstominimizethetotalnumberofprediction
errors. Finally, boosting is a method of converting a “weak”
learning algorithm which performs only slightly better than
random guessing into one that performs extremely well.
All three of these topics will be explained in more detail
below. All have been studied extensively in the past. In this
paper, the close relationship between these three seemingly
unrelated topics will be broughtout.
Here is an outline of the paper. We will begin with a
review of game theory. Then we will describe an algorithm
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for learning to play repeated games based on the on-line
prediction methods of Littlestone and Warmuth [15]. The
analysisofthisalgorithmyieldsanew(asfarasweknow)and
simple proofof von Neumann’s famous minmax theorem, as
well as a provable method of approximately solvinga game.
In the last part of the paper we show that the on-line
prediction model is obtained by applying the game-playing
algorithmtoan appropriatechoice ofgame and thatboosting
is obtained by applying the same algorithm to the “dual” of
this game.
2 GAME THEORY
We begin with a review of basic game theory. Further back-
groundcan befoundinany introductorytextongame theory;
see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole [11]. We study two-
person games in normal form. That is, each game is deﬁned
by a matrix
M. There are two players called the row player
andcolumnplayer. Toplaythegame, therowplayerchooses
ar o w
i, and, simultaneously, the column player chooses a
column






) is the loss suffered by
the row player.
For instance, the loss matrix for the children’s game








The row player’s goal is to minimize its loss. Often, the
goal of the column player is to maximize this loss, in which
case the game is said to be “zero-sum.” Most of our results
are given in the context of a zero-sum game. However, our
results also apply when no assumptions are made about the
goal or strategy of the column player. We return to this point
below.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all the losses
are in the range
[0
;1
]. Simple scaling can be used to get
more general results. Also, we restrict ourselves to the case
wherethenumber of choicesavailabletoeach player isﬁnite.
However, most of the results translate with very mild addi-
tional assumptions to cases in which the number of choices
is inﬁnite. For a discussion of inﬁnite matrix games see, for
instance, Chapter 2 in Ferguson [3].2.1 RANDOMIZED PLAY
As described above, the players choose a single row or col-




M, and (simultaneously) the column player chooses
a distribution
Q over columns. The row player’s expected































), and refer to it simply as the loss (rather than
expected loss). In addition, if the row player chooses a dis-
tribution
P butthe column player chooses a singlecolumn
j,

























) is deﬁned analogously.
Individual(deterministicallychosen) rows
i and columns
j are called pure strategies. Randomized plays deﬁned by
distributions
P and
Q over rows and columns are called





Up untilnow, we have assumed that the players choose their
(pure or mixed) strategies simultaneously. Suppose now that
instead play is sequential. That is, suppose that the column
player chooses its strategy
Q after the row player has chosen
andannounceditsstrategy
P. Assumefurtherthatthecolumn
player’s goal is to maximize the row player’s loss (i.e., that
the game is zero-sum). Then given
P, such a “worst-case”







); that is, if the row player plays mixed strategy
P,










(It is understood here and throughout the paper that maxQ
denotes maximum over all probabilitydistributionsover col-
umns; similarly, minP will always denote minimum over
all probability distributions over rows. These extrema exist
becausethesetofdistributionsoveraﬁnitespaceiscompact.)
Knowing this, the row player should choose
P to mini-












￿ realizing this minimumis called a min-
max strategy.
Suppose now that the column player plays ﬁrst and the
row player can choose its play with the beneﬁt of knowing
thecolumnplayer’schosenstrategy
Q. Then byasymmetric













2.3 THE MINMAX THEOREM
Intuitively,we expect the playerwho chooses itsstrategy last
to have the advantage since it plays knowing its opponent’s




















We might go on naively to conjecture that the advantage of
playing last is strict for some games so that, at least in some
cases, the inequalityin Eq. (2) is strict.
Surprisingly,itturnsoutnot tomatter which playerplays
ﬁrst. Von Neumann’s well-known minmax theorem states




















M. The common value
v of the two sides
of theequalityis called thevalue of the game
M. A proofof
the minmax theorem will be given in Section 2.5.














v. Symmetrically, it means that the column player has
a (maxmin) strategy
Q
￿ such that, regardless of the strategy
P played by the row player the loss will be at least
v.T h i s




￿ are optimal in a strong
sense.
Thus, classical game theory says that given a (zero-sum)
game
M, one should play using a minmax strategy. Such a
strategy can be computed using linear programming.
However, there are a number of problems with this ap-
proach. For instance,
￿
M may be unknown;
￿
M may be so large that computing a minmax strategy
using linear programming is infeasible;
￿ the columnplayer may notbe trulyadversarial and may
behaveinamannerthatadmitslosssigniﬁcantlysmaller
than the game value
v.
Overcoming these difﬁculties in the one-shot game is
hopeless. But suppose instead that we are playing the game
repeatedly. Then it is natural to ask if one can learn to play
well against the particular opponent that is being faced.
2.4 REPEATED PLAY
Sucha modelof repeated playcan beformalized asdescribed
below. To emphasize the roles of the two players, we refer
to the row player as the learner and the column player as the
environment.
Let
M be a matrix, possiblyunknowntothe learner. The















be chosen with knowledge of
P
t)









i; this is the loss it would have suffered had it
played using pure strategy
i;









The goal of the learner is to do almost as well as the best









2whichwere chosen bytheenvironment. That is, the learner’s





























majority algorithm”[15], and is essentially equivalent to our
earlier “Hedge” algorithm [9]. The algorithm, called LW,
is quite simple. The learner maintains nonnegative weights






) denote the weight at time
t on
row







































i, the learner updates the




























) is a parameter of the algorithm.
The main theorem concerning this algorithm is the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 1 For any matrix M with
n rows and entries in
[0
;1



































































Proof: The prooffollowsdirectlyfromTheorem 2ofFreund
andSchapire[9],whichinturnisasimpleanddirectgeneral-
ization of Littlestone and Warmuth [15]. For completeness,




￿ also approaches 1. In addition,
for ﬁxed





n becomes negligible(since it is ﬁxed)
relative to
T. Thus, by choosing
￿ close to 1, the learner can
ensurethatitslosswillnotbemuch worsethanthelossofthe
best strategy. This is formalized in the followingcorollary:


































































1 , we see that the amount by
which the average per-trial loss of the learner exceeds that
of the best mixed strategy can be made arbitrarily small for
large
T.
For simplicity, the results in the remainder of the pa-
per are based on Corollary 2 rather than Theorem 1. The
details of the algorithm about which this corollary applies
are largely unimportant and could, in principle, be applied
to any algorithmwith similar properties. Indeed, algorithms
forthisproblemwithsimilarpropertieswere derivedbyHan-
nan[13],1 Blackwell[1]and FosterandVohra[6, 5, 4]. Also,
Fudenberg and Levine [10] independentlyproposed an algo-
rithmequivalent to LW and proved a slightlyweaker version
of Corollary 2.
As asimpleﬁrst corollary,we see thatthelossof LWcan
never exceed the value of the game
M by more than D
T.


















v is the value of the game M.
Proof: Let
P
￿ be a minmax strategy for

















































strategyusedbytheenvironment. Theorem 1guarantees that
its cumulative loss is not much larger than that of any ﬁxed
mixed strategy. As shown above, this implies, in particular,
that the loss cannot be much larger than the game value.
However, if the environment is non-adversarial, there might
be a better ﬁxed mixed strategy for the player, in which case
thealgorithmisguaranteedtobealmostasgoodasthisbetter
strategy.
2.5 PROOF OF THE MINMAX THEOREM
More interestingly, Corollary 2 can be used to derive a very
simple proof of von Neumann’s minmax theorem. To prove






























relatively straightforwardand so is omitted.)
Suppose that we run algorithm LW against a maximally
adversarial environment which always chooses strategies














































































































T can be made arbitrarily close to zero, this proves
Eq. (4) and the minmax theorem.
2.6 APPROXIMATELY SOLVING A GAME
Aside from yielding a proof for a famous theorem that by
now has many proofs, the preceding derivation shows that




Skippingtheﬁrst inequalityof thesequence of equalities























P is an approximate minmax strategy in the








exceed the game value
v by more than D
T.S i n c e D
T can
be made arbitrarily small, this approximation can be made
arbitrarilytight.
















t satisfyingEq. (5)can alwaysbechosen
to be a pure strategy (i.e., a mixed strategy concentrated on
a single column of
M). Therefore, the approximate maxmin
strategy
Q has the additional favorable property of being
sparseinthesensethatatmost
T ofitsentrieswillbenonzero.
Viewing LW as a method of approximately solving a
gamewillbe centraltoourderivationofaboostingalgorithm
(Section 4).
Similar and closely related methods of approximately
solving linear programming problems have previously ap-
peared, for instance, in the work of Plotkin, Shmoys and
Tardos [16].
3 ON-LINE PREDICTION
Since the game-playing algorithm LW presented in Sec-
tion 2.4 is a direct generalization of the on-line prediction
algorithmof Littlestone and Warmuth [15], it is not surpris-
ing that an on-line prediction algorithm can be derived from
the more general game-playing algorithm by an appropriate
choice of game
M. In this section, we make this connection
explicit.
In the on-line prediction model, ﬁrst introduced by Lit-
tlestone [14], the learner observes a sequence of examples
and predicts their labels one at a time. The learner’s goal is
to minimize its prediction errors.
Formally,let















be an unknowntarget concept, not necessarily in
H.2
In the on-lineprediction model, learning takes place in a





















of the label associated with
x
t;






The goal of the learner is to minimize the expected number
of mistakes that it makes relative to the best hypothesis in
the space
H. (The expectation here is with respect to the
learner’s own randomization.) Thus, we ask that the learner
perform well whenever the target
c is “close” to one of the
hypotheses in
H.
It is straightforwardnow to reduce the on-line prediction
problemtoa special case of the repeated game problem. The




X that is presented to the learner on a
given iteration. The learner’s choice of a row corresponds








). A mixed strategy for the learner corresponds
to making a random choice of a hypothesis with which to
predict. In this reduction the environment uses only pure
strategies. The game matrix thus has
j
H
































0o t h e r w i s e .
2 As was said above, much of this analysis can be generalized
to inﬁnite sets. The cardinality of the set of examples is actually
of no real consequence. Littlestone and Warmuth [15] generalize
theirresultstocountablyinﬁnite setsofhypotheses,andFreundand
Schapire [9] and Freund [8] give generalizations to uncountably







) is 1 if and only if
h disagrees with the target
c on instance
x. We call this a mistake matrix.
The application of the algorithm LW described in Sec-
tion 2.4 to the on-line predictionproblem is as follows.3 We
apply the algorithmto mistake matrix
M. On round
t,g i v e n
instance
x




M (i.e., over hypothesis space
































date the weights maintained by LW. (Here, the strategy
Q
t


































































































by a direct application of Corollary 2 (for an appropriate
choice of
￿). Thus, the expected number of mistakes made
by the learner cannot exceed the number of mistakes made
by the best hypothesis in










A more careful analysis (using Theorem 1 rather than
Corollary2)givesa betterboundidenticaltothatobtainedby
Littlestone and Warmuth [15] (not surprisingly). Still better
bounds using more sophisticated methods were obtained by
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2] and Vovk [18].
This result can be straightforwardly generalized to any
bounded loss function (such as square loss rather than zero-
one mistake loss), and also to a setting in which the learner
competes against a set of experts rather than a ﬁxed set of
hypotheses. (See, for instance, Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2] and
Freund and Schapire [9].)
4 BOOSTING
The third topic of this paper is boosting. Boosting is the
problem of converting a “weak” learning algorithm that per-
forms just slightlybetter than random guessing into one that
performs with arbitrarily good accuracy. The ﬁrst provably
effectiveboostingalgorithmwasdiscoveredbySchapire[17].
Freund[7]subsequentlypresentedamuchimprovedboosting
algorithm which is optimal in particular circumstances. The
boosting algorithm derived in this section is closely related
to Freund and Schapire’s more recent “AdaBoost” boosting
algorithm [9].
3Thereductionis notspeciﬁcto the useofLW. Otheralgorithms
for playing repeated games can be combined with this reduction to
giveon-linelearningalgorithms. However,thesealgorithmsneedto
be capable of working without complete knowledge of the matrix.
It should be sufﬁcient for the algorithm to receive as input only
the identity and contents of columns that have been chosen by the
environmentin the past.
As in Section 3, let
X be a space of instances,
H a space
of hypotheses, and
c the target concept. For
￿
>0, we say







if, for any distribution
Q over the set
X, the algorithm takes
as inputa set of labeled examples distributedaccording to
Q
and outputs a hypothesis
h
2
























Given a weak learning algorithm, the goal of boosting
is to run the weak learning algorithm many times on many
distributions, and to combine the selected hypotheses into a
ﬁnal hypothesiswitharbitrarilysmall error rate. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we simplify the boosting model further
to require that the ﬁnal hypothesis have error zero so that all
instances are correctly classiﬁed. The algorithm presented
can certainly be modiﬁed to ﬁt the more standard (and prac-
tical) model in which the ﬁnal error must be less than some
positive parameter















passed to the weak learner;














































The important issues for designing a boosting algorithm
are: (1) how to choose distributions
D
t,a n d( 2 )h o wt o
combine the
h
t’s into a ﬁnal hypothesis.
4.1 BOOSTING AND THE MINMAX THEOREM
Beforedescribingourboostingalgorithm,letusstepback for
a moment to consider the relationship between the mistake
matrix
M used in Section 3 and the minmax theorem. This
relationship will turn out to be highly relevant to the design
and understandingof the boosting algorithm.
Recall that the mistake matrix
M h a sr o w sa n dc o l u m n s
























￿-weakly learnable (so that there exists a
￿-weak learning algorithm), what does the minmax theorem
say about
M? Suppose that the value of
M is






































4The standard boosting model usually also includes a “conﬁ-
dence”parameter
￿
>0 which boundsthe probability of the boost-
ing algorithm failing to ﬁnd a ﬁnal hypothesis with low error. This
parameteris necessaryif we assumethat the weaklearneronly suc-
ceeds with high probability. However, because we here make the
simplifying assumption that the weak learner always succeeds in
ﬁnding a weak hypothesis with error at most 1
=2
￿
￿,w eh a v en o
needofaconﬁdenceparameterandinsteadrequire thattheboosting
algorithm succeedwith absolute certainty.
5(It is straightforwardto show that, for any



























































































On the other hand, the left part of Eq. (6) implies that
there exists a distribution
P
￿ over the hypothesis space
H



































That is, every instance
x i sm i s c l a s s i ﬁ e db yl e s st h a n1
=2o f
the hypotheses (as weighted by
P
￿). Therefore, the target
concept
c is functionally equivalent to a weighted majority
of hypotheses in
H.







c can be computed ex-
actly as a weighted majority of hypotheses in
H. Moreover,
the weights used in this function (deﬁned by distribution
P
￿
above) are not just any old weights, but rather are a minmax
strategy for the game
M.
A similar proof technique was previously used by Gold-
mann, H˚ astad and Razborov [12] to prove a result about the
representation power of circuits of weighted threshold gates.
4.2 IDEA FOR BOOSTING
The idea of our boosting algorithm then is to approximate
c
by approximating the weights of this function. Since these
weights are a minmax strategy of the game
M, we might
hope to apply the method described in Section 2.4 for ap-
proximately solving a game.
The problem is that the resulting algorithm does not ﬁt
theboostingmodel. Recall thaton each round,algorithmLW
computesadistributionover therowsofthegamematrix(hy-
potheses, inthe case of matrix
M). However, in theboosting




over rows, but need one that computes distributions over
columns, the obvious solution is to reverse the roles of rows
and columns. This is exactly the approach that we follow.
That is, rather than using game
M directly, we construct the
dual of
M which is the identical game except that the roles
of the row and column players have been reversed.
Constructing the dual
M
0 of a game
M is straightfor-
ward. First, we need to reverse row and column so we take
the transpose
MT. This, however, is not enough since the
column player of
M wants to maximize the outcome, but
the row player of
M
0 wants to minimize the outcome (loss).
Therefore, we also need to reverse the meaning of minimum




being in the range
[0
;1
], we add the constant 1 to every out-











where 1 is an all 1’s matrix of the appropriate dimensions.
In the case of the mistake matrix
M, the dual now has
rows and columns indexed by instances and hypotheses, re-

































0. Therefore, whereas before
we were interested in ﬁnding an approximate minmax strat-
egy of




We can now apply algorithm LW to game matrix
M
0
since, by the results of Section 2.6, this will lead to the con-
structionof an approximate maxmin strategy. The reduction
proceeds as follows: On round
t of boosting
1. algorithm LW computes a distribution
P












the weak learning algorithm;
























4. the weights maintained by algorithm LW are updated
where
Q




given in Section 2.6, on each round
t,
Q
t may be a pure
strategy
h











































t should have maximum accuracy with re-
spect to distribution
P
t. This is exactly the goal of the weak
learner. (Although it is not guaranteed to succeed in ﬁnding
the best
h
t, ﬁnding one of accuracy 1
=2
+
￿ turns out to be


















0.S i n c e
Q






















c for sufﬁciently large
T.W e
show in this section how this follows from Corollary2.





























































































































x.T h e r e -
fore, by deﬁnition of
h
￿














For this to hold, we need only that D
T
<
￿ , which will










The resulting boosting algorithm, in which the game-
playing subroutine LW has been “compiled out” is shown in
Fig. 1. The algorithmis actually quite intuitivein this form:
after each hypothesis
h
t is observed, the weight associated
with each instance
x is decreased if
h
t is correct on that
instance and otherwise is increased. Thus, each distribution
focuses on the examples most likely to be misclassiﬁed by
the preceding hypotheses.
In practice, of course, the booster would not have access
to the labels associated with the entire domain
X.R a t h e r ,
the booster would be given a labeled training set and all dis-
tributionswouldbe computed over the trainingset. The gen-
eralization error of the ﬁnal hypothesis can then be bounded
using, for instance, standard “VC theory” (see Freund and
Schapire [9] for more details).
A more sophisticated version of this algorithm, called
AdaBoost, is given by Freund and Schapire [9]. The advan-
tage of this version is that the learner does not need to know
a priorithe minimum accuracy rate of each weak hypothesis.
5 SUMMARY
In sum, we have shown how the two well-studied learning
problems of on-line prediction and boosting can be cast in a
singlegame-theoreticframeworkinwhichthetwoseemingly
very different problems can be viewed as “duals” of one
another.
We hope that the insight offered by this connection will
help in the development and understanding of such learn-
ing algorithms since an algorithm for one problem may, in
principle, be translated into an algorithm for the other. As
a concrete example, the boosting algorithm described in this
paper was derived from Littlestoneand Warmuth’s weighted
majority algorithmby followingthis dual connection.
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t to weak learner.
























































1o t h e r w i s e
where
Z
t is a normalization constant (chosen so that
D
t
















Figure 1: The boosting algorithm.
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). The second line
















]. The last lineuses the deﬁnition of
P
t.













































































































































<1. Rearranging terms, and


































Since the minimum (over mixed strategies
P) in the bound
of the theorem must be achieved by a pure strategy
j,t h i s
implies the theorem.
8